Occupational risks, safety, and masculinity: Newfoundland fish harvesters' experiences and understandings of fishery risks
Introduction but expert, scientific knowledge is hegemonic among these different knowledge systems and this status, as much as its superiority over lay knowledge, underlies its acceptance as truth. As argued in research on traditional or local knowledge (see, for example, Haggan et al., 2007 ) the hegemonic status of research by safety experts may be marginalizing and masking important insights about safety and risk available from other sources including the observations and experiences of fish harvesters. From the perspective of Wynne and others, avoiding this potential pitfall requires a "de-privileging" of hegemonic knowledges and risk constructions. This paper assumes that, like the notion of risk itself, all knowledge (lay and expert) is socially and culturally constructed (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003: p. 1; Zinn, 2004: p. 5 ) as well as, perhaps particularly in the cases of fisheries, being mediated by ecology. It is, in other words, a socialecological product mediated by the history, location and experiences of the knower (Dolan et al., 2005: p. 2). Constructionist positions are often taken to be the opposite of realist approaches.
However, Wynne (2002: p.462) suggests that this is a false dualism. Rather, he calls for "constructivist-realism," an approach that opens space for more nuanced and comprehensive understandings of the "real." He argues,
[p]hysical reality still courses through these contending and overtly less determinate representations and meanings, but different versions of reality are not only competing in the sense of claiming or denying the reality of an element of nature. They may also be making conflicting claims that a real element is more salient once one gives the issue a particular meaning. The same natural reality thus shows up differently, depending on the intersections it is given with human questions and commitments (Wynne, 2002: p.462) .
From this perspective, expert-scientific risk knowledge does not reflect only an "objective" reality and is not the only way of getting at "the real." It is, instead, the hegemonic way of talking about, identifying and managing risk and safety used by governing agencies and reflects the social-cultural dynamics of those agencies. Using a constructivist-realist approach, we can interpret the differences between experts' and fish harvesters' ways of identifying and understanding risks as reflecting differences in when, where and how they observe their world and in the way they interpret those observations. The view from the deck of the vessel, fish harvesters' experiences on the water, not only informs their observations and interpretations of risk but offers potential insights into risk and into expert claims about risk that should be taken into account when trying to understand fishing risk and improve safety.
There is no single, objective place from which to assess risk and the best way to assess and minimize risk is through interdisciplinary and intersectoral approaches, seeking input from a variety of different knowledge agents focusing on different sources and dimensions of risk and using multiple methodologies. In this paper, I draw on Wynne's work on constructivist-realism and on the feminist literature on masculinity to examine fish harvesters' understandings and experiences of risk and safety in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador on Canada's east coast. Using data drawn from focus groups, phone interviews and particularly from individual boat tours with Newfoundland fish harvesters, I argue that their understandings and practices of risk and safety are dynamic and that this dynamism reflects the intersection of everyday requirements to get the job done in what are often uncertain and constrained circumstances associated with the interacting and changing regulatory, industrial and environmental contexts in which this work is done. From this perspective, while quantifying fisheries risks in terms of fatality, accident or Search and Rescue incident rates is important, the inclusion of fish harvesters' experiences and related safety knowledge in research and policy-development designed to reduce risk is imperative. This approach is also a means to promote understanding and awareness among those including harvesters, safety experts and policy-makers with an interest in minimizing risk through co-management of safety.
I also argue that harvesters' knowledge, experience and responses to dynamic environments are mediated by the ways in which gender structures fisheries work and its cultural meanings for men. This kind of gendered approach is conspicuously absent from much of the research on occupational health and safety, including fishing safety, and risk (see Stella, 1996 for an exception). With some notable exceptions, namely recent case studies in the construction (Iacuone, 2005; Paap, 2003) and mining (Somerville & Abrahamsson, 2003) industries, the occupational health and safety literature tends to ignore gender or assume a male subject (Messing, 1998) . In the wider literature on risk, where it appears, gender is treated as a variable mediating risk perceptions or preferences (see Finucane et al., 2000; Gustafson, 1998) .
Masculinity is not only, if it is at all, simply a personality trait that causes risk-taking behaviour or shapes risk perception. The story is more complex than this. Gender is a way of ordering social practice in relation to reproduction at the individual, interactional, symbolic and institutional levels, and it does so in ways that reflect and reproduce patriarchal ideologies and structures (Connell, 1995: p. 71-3) . From this perspective, masculinities and femininities are historically-and culturally-specific places in gender relations -places that are different and unequal --that organise divisions of labour; shape access to wealth, resources and power; inform bodily practices; and order symbolic representations, values and meanings (Connell 1995, p. 71; Kimmel, 2001, p.21 ). One's place within gender relations has implications for the acquisition of knowledge and for how risk is interpreted and experienced.
Methods
These findings derive from an analysis of data collected in one component of a multi-layered, multidisciplinary project on fishing safety carried out by researchers through SafetyNet. The phone interview schedule was developed drawing on insights from the focus groups and on survey questionnaires used in earlier, similar research on fish harvesters' perceptions of risk.
Survey questions asked harvesters about their experiences fishing in 2004. The survey instrument was pre-tested and adjusted and was shortened after each pre-test. Our original goal was to survey a random sample of 100 professional fish harvesters stratified on the basis of region and on the basis of level of professional certification. To find our sample, we asked the PFHCB to generate a stratified random sample of 600 names from its list of professional fish harvesters, which includes all registered fish harvesters in Newfoundland. In the spring of 2005, the PFHCB mailed a package of information to each of these individuals containing information about the study, a letter of support from the PFHCB, a contact reply form and a stamped, selfaddressed envelope for those interested in participating. We received only 35 responses to this initial mail-out and, from these, were able to complete 25 phone interviews. We attribute the low response rate to this initial request to turmoil in the industry that erupted in the snow crab fishery around the time of the mailout, and to the fact that the mailout took place after many harvesters were back fishing.
We attempted to increase our response rate for the survey by asking the PFHCB to send a second package of information to the same participants in September. We received 19 responses to this second mail-out and, from these, managed to complete 15 interviews. We also discussed the research during a radio interview with the host of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's
Fisheries Broadcast during which we issued an invitation to harvesters to participate. This advertisement generated an additional three responses (calls to a secure, toll free line) and to the return of one more contact reply form from our original sample. In light of the overall low response rate to these multiple initiatives, we revisited the last few pre-test interviews we had conducted using a version of the survey instrument that was very close to the final version and, with the permission of three individuals, re-classified their interviews from pre-test to test interviews. Thus, our total number of completed surveys for this component is 46. This is not a large enough sample to generalize to the harvester population, but these lengthy surveys have provided a very important source of additional information for this component. The fish harvesters we interviewed by phone started fishing between the ages of 10 and 32 years (average of 16.8 years), and they ranged in age from 22 to 67 years (average of 47.4). Years fishing ranged: 4 had fished 15 years or less; 18 had fished between 15 and 29 years; and, 24 had fished for 30 years or longer. Forty-one percent of those surveyed had not graduated from high school.
All 46 had received some formal training related to fishing ranging from a Basic Safety Training course to qualifications in Marine Engineering or Marine Diesel Mechanics. Sixty-seven per cent of fish harvesters surveyed worked in the less than 35' sector and 32 had core status. Of the harvesters interviewed, 27 were skippers and the rest crew.
We also completed ten boat tours, seven on vessels under 35 feet in length and three on vessels measuring between 35 and 65 feet. The boat tours took place on harvesters' vessels, while docked, and combined qualitative interviews, with demonstrations, observation and a mapping exercise. During the boat tours harvesters were asked what they did to fish safely and to identify risky activities and their locations on the vessel. They were then asked to describe and, where possible, re-enact their strategies for dealing with them. Participants were asked to add details to a generic diagram of a vessel deck to make it match their workspace and to identify on the diagram places or tasks they perceived to be risky or dangerous. The resultant maps serve as visual representations of perceived workplace risks and were also used to illustrate steps they took to reduce risk. The mapping tool was adapted from an occupational health and safety research tool developed for industrial environments.
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The focus groups enabled the collection of information related to the broad theme of fishing risk.
This information provides valuable insights into the safety-related aspects of changes in fishing over the decade between the groundfish moratoria and the time of the research. Focus group discussions may trigger ideas and information that might be overlooked or forgotten in one-onone interviews but these data lack the depth of experience and information that can be derived from detailed one-on-one interviews. The semi-public nature of focus groups also, however, means some individuals will not speak openly about certain kinds of concerns or events. This is perhaps particularly true for crew members. The focus group data guided the design of the phone interview schedule. These were designed to test verbal, formal knowledge and, in this case, the generalizability of our findings by accessing more harvesters including some from regions where we were not able to hold focus groups. Neither the focus groups nor the phone interviews were, however, very good at accessing the experiential and embodied dimensions of work and risk.
One of the goals of the boat tours was to move from a discussion organized mainly around perceived risks to one that included the strategies used by skippers and captains to keep themselves and their crew safe. The boat tours moved safety and risk discussions on to vessels and provided an opportunity for a small group of harvesters to act out certain activities and to map sources of risk as well as strategies for dealing with them thereby opening up new opportunities for discussion and exploration and reducing the chance of misunderstanding on the part of the researcher.
Risk Knowledges in a Context of Change
Major environmental, policy and industrial shifts are radically altering Newfoundland's fisheries with important health consequences (Dolan et al., 2005) . With the collapse of the groundfish stocks and closure of these fisheries, there was an industrial shift in target species from cod to shellfish, especially snow crab, and from fleet with a substantial number of large-scale trawlers to one dominated almost exclusively by vessels less than 65 feet in length. Changes in fleet structure and targeted species resulted in an increase in offshore activity in the under 65 foot sector associated with a shift from cod to snow crab and shrimp.
Fisheries management also changed in response to the groundfish collapses. There was a regulatory shift from Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and gear limitations for the smaller boat sector to Individual Quotas (IQs) that allocate quotas to individual enterprises or harvesters. At the level of practice, the owner-operator and fleet separation policies are being undermined as quotas are increasingly treated as property, bought and sold under the guise of so-called trust agreements (Praxis, 2005: p.35) . Current "replacement license" policy allows the use of the license to be separated from its title, which in practice allows the purchaser -another fish harvester, a non-fish harvester or a company --to use a license that is in a different name from that of the purchaser (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1996) .
In 1997 the Department of Fisheries and Oceans instituted a targeted reclassification scheme that divides fish harvesters in the under 65 foot fleet into core and non-core categories. To limit capacity, there is exclusive membership in the core group, entry into which is through replacement and conditional on meeting prerequisites including having an enterprise and key These reports give us a good impression of the overall patterns of major risk incidents. They do not, however, provide a sense of how fish harvesters manage and negotiate risks on a day to day basis within this context of industrial and regulatory change. In the remainder of this paper, I
outline some of the ways in which fish harvesters talk about risk and safety and some of the strategies they use for dealing with risk and uncertainty. The data reveal two, sometimes competing, sets of risk and safety knowledges and practices. One is grounded in the official discourses about risk and safety that emphasises formal training, vessel design and safety equipment. The other is rooted in everyday work experience; it emphasises the work platform, experience on the water and hands-on learning. There was, on the one hand, much support for mandatory safety training and equipment among respondents who had participated in training and were actively involved in the professionalisation movement, and also among younger fish harvesters. On the other hand, there was a competing understanding of safety, one that claimed that classroom-based learning cannot replace experience and "commonsense." One possible interpretation of this is that the latter position reflects resistance to what harvesters perceive as "over-regulation" which they find threatening and feel is undermining their work autonomy, a culturally valued aspect of fishing work. Another possibility is that those who reject training are denying risk. Yet, even those fish harvesters active in professionalisation tended to support the claim that experience and commonsense were invaluable in mitigating risk. Indeed, this is reconciled in their certification process that credits both formal training and sea time. A resistance, even if partial, to the official risk knowledge may reflect that it alone is not enough to keep fish harvesters safe in the everyday work environment. To examine this tension further, I
discuss the case of rope, an example of an everyday risk identified by harvesters that is not considered in the formal regulation of risk and safety, and how fish harvesters use their "commonsense knowledge" to negotiate strategies to deal with this risk. I then move to a discussion about fish harvesters' responses when this commonsense knowledge does not quite fit the new fishing context. The POR team used the boat tours with captains and skippers to collect detailed information about risks and the ways in which fish harvesters keep themselves safe in relation to risks.
During the tours, we asked the question: "How do you stay safe while fishing?" Harvesters described numerous strategies to mitigate the risk of entanglement. In terms of vessel design and construction, they have sought to maximize the deck space available but their ability to do that is Reconciling the demand for space with these constraints has included the purchase of longer vessels which are then shortened, widening and deepening their vessels, and moving the wheelhouse closer to the bow. Despite these structural modifications, they often end up with extremely limited deck space and still miles of rope to manage.
Other strategies reflect attempts to minimize the movement of the gear and rope and to control the pathways through which the rope flows. They do this by shooting pots in calm weather and during daylight hours, keeping stacks of pots low and tied down, securing moving parts with stays, applying carpet and non-skid paint to their decks to minimize the risk of slipping, and generally trying to keep their deck clean and tidy. Some control rope by manipulating their shooting speed. Harvesters also reported strategies for managing bodies in relation to rope. To avoid becoming tangled in rope, skippers or captains instruct crew to minimize the movement of their feet on the deck by bracing their legs against the deck, gunnel or railing. Crew members also tend to do the same job all the time and greenhorns are assigned to easier, safer jobs. While shooting, skippers restrict the number of crew on deck to those required to shoot the pots. Others hire crew whose job it is to watch the moving rope. One way to minimize the crew movement, and hence risk, is to set up an assembly line for shooting pots in which one worker takes a pot from the stack, baits and ties it, rolls it to another, who then passes it to a third to shoot off the gunnel. experience that has been accumulated through practice, hands-on work and bodily exercise (Power, 2005: p.139 ). The personal work histories of "traditional" 4 fish harvesters include long careers on the water, accumulated experience and skill, and possession of inter-generational know-how. This is reflected in our survey results where 85% of fish harvesters reported learning about risk and safety by trial and error, 70% from their father, and 74% from a skipper. The everyday work of fishing requires a bodily strategy to deal with physical work in a liquid, and thus uncertain, environment. The local way of talking about fishing as "in the blood" captures this habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) or bodily capital (Wacquant, 1995) acquired through the day to day practice of mundane work routines. To quote Wacquant (1995, p.67), "[b] odily capital and bodily labor are thus linked by a recursive relation which makes them closely dependent on one another" (emphasis in original).
Embodied knowledge is difficult to quantify or understand without being experienced. But these experiences and claims to these local discourses are mediated by a gender structure that informs not just any body. Rather, it is generally the masculine body that mediates the requirements of everyday work. Women are not able to claim in the same ways that fishing is "in the blood" (Power, 2005: p.98 ). Acquisition of commonsense, then, is a "bodily exercise" (Palsson, 2000: p.37) organised by gender and mediated by a particular version of masculinity, that has its basis in local understandings of the "traditional."
Gender organises industrial-and community-based divisions of labour and space that delineate men's work, including its symbolic order and meanings (Power, 2005: ch. 3). Harvesters view this work as challenging, allowing them an opportunity to "be their own boss." "Being a fisherman" --working outdoors, independently --has been the cultural ideal for men in rural
Newfoundland. This fishing is work that must be understood in relation to the past, tradition, and a way of life. It is connected to larger narratives of hard times and survival, to a collective identity, and to a pride of place. These cultural meanings are created and recreated in many ways, one of which is through story-telling. This is increasingly done through the media, especially in the coverage of marine tragedies. Stories highlight certain risks in fishing and attempt to explain the causes of accidents, injuries and loss of life. These stories also impart meanings about what it means to be a fish harvester and a man. Discursively at least, fish harvesters become heroes when they die at sea.
This gender structure has also shaped access to wealth and resources, within larger exploitative capitalist relations. This is reflected in local patterns of patrilineal inheritance and the patriarchal state policies that support these patterns (Neis, 1993; Neis & Williams, 1997) . Boys and young men have access to fishing property, inter-generational know-how and observations of the goings-on in the world of men. And current professionalisation and licensing and quota schemes uphold this "patriarchal dividend" (Connell, 1995: p.79) . In Newfoundland and Labrador, access to fishing licenses and quotas is limited through professionalization and membership in the core fishery. Here, as elsewhere, few women are eligible because they lack direct fishing capital or property, and do not own any or at least key licenses (Grzetic, 2004:p. 19-21; Munk-Madsen, 1998: p.234 ). The criteria developed for professional advancement in the industry assume a male entrepreneur embedded in a fishing enterprise unencumbered by family responsibilities, like domestic and child responsibilities, which constrain access to the training and mean women often have shorter or interrupted fishing careers and thus less total and annual fisheries income. The processing sector, where women tend to work, is not part of the professionalization. All of these things serve to strengthen male control of the fishery.
It is within these gendered divisions of labour, gendered access to resources, and gendered material, bodily and symbolic systems that men acquire "commonsense" related to safety. The example of injury and disability illustrates this interconnectivity. Harvesters in this study largely accepted that certain bodily injury is "normal" and part of the job. At the same time, if serious enough, work-related disability can undermine a man's ability to adhere to locally valued masculine constructions (Murray, 2005) . In the absence of extensive safety regulation for vessels measuring under 35 feet in length, the gendered acquisition of commonsense has meant that, until recently, safety was regulated through informal apprenticeships and mentoring -the quality of which has been undoubtedly variable -serving to both enhance and mitigate risk. The point here is not to assess the effectiveness of strategies used by fish harvesters to deal with risk. It might be, for example, that some of the strategies to deal with the risks entailed in working with rope are, in fact, rather risky. Instead, it is to suggest that examining risk in the context of fish harvesters' everyday and gendered lives provides another lens through which to understand risk, and in doing so, reveals the possible limitations of relying only on official risk knowledges, especially if the goal is indeed to reduce risk in the everyday working lives of fish harvesters.
Shifting Knowledges
The shift from cod to snow crab brings with it the challenges of fishing unfamiliar grounds for a new target species using new vessel designs and equipment. This has resulted in the creation of "inexperienced harvesters" --harvesters who have a comprehensive knowledge of a particular fishery in particular coastal locations and of particular technologies but who now fish new grounds for new target species using newly designed or modified vessels and new technologies.
These conditions make unlikely the easy transfer of traditional, commonsense knowledge and practice to the current fishing context. The shift from cod to snow crab has also meant shorter fishing seasons and if embodied "commonsense" knowledge is acquired on the job, a shorter season means less opportunity to acquire it. Shorter fishing seasons also mean longer periods of time on land, and thus bodies may not adjust to work at sea as readily as they once did. In light of this context of uncertainty and change, fish harvesters largely assessed formal safety training as valuable. This assessment also likely reflects the widespread compliance in our sample with the relatively recent regulation requiring all fish harvesters to complete, by 2007, a
Marine Emergency Duties course. Eighty percent of survey respondents reported learning about risk and safety in formal training. Acceptance of formal training appears to be linked to age. In the phone survey, older fish harvesters were less likely to place a lot of importance on training than younger harvesters ( Figure 6 ). Yet, even where older harvesters were unlikely to see the value of training for themselves, they tended to accept its value for young people. This makes sense in light of recent trends that make difficult the acquisition or relevance of commonsense knowledge through established means, including the shift in target species and fishing location, shorter fishing seasons, changes in crew recruitment and retention, new economic arrangements and the increased use of larger vessels and new technologies. To a large degree, the Marine Emergency Duties courses reinforce the idea that risk and safety are embedded in the vessel and its technologies. These courses focus on emergency responses, primarily on how to use safety technologies when the vessel and other technologies fail and do not directly deal with the risks of day to day fishing. The PFHCB's apprentice course though attempts to reconcile this tension by combining the Marine Emergency Duties A3 course with an introduction to safe fishing vessel operations and general seamanship and stability. While professionalisation recognises experience (as accumulated sea time), it has also institutionalised a status system that is based on quantified formal training.
Shifting masculinities
Just as acquiring commonsense takes place within gender relations, so too does the formal learning process. The fisherman is the presumed target of formal training. Despite the fact that the PFHCB's version of the Marine Emergency Duties A3 course in particular has been heavily subscribed to by women, there persists, even among some instructors, a widespread belief that women do not really fish. 6 This reflects the widespread yet unsubstantiated belief that women are falsely recorded as crew members on vessels to gain access to Employment Insurance benefits. In fact, provincial participation rates for women fish harvesters increased from eight per cent in 1981 to 20 per cent by 2000 (Grzetic, 2004: p. 17) . The increased participation of women in harvesting means that men, and women, must negotiate work and learning spaces that have new gender arrangements.
To illustrate, let's consider how investment in particular vessel designs and technologies may be linked to the reconfiguring of masculinity. Most fish harvesters described the snow crab fishery as dangerous, but there was also a tendency to feminise it, describing it as lacking competitiveness and requiring little skill. According to this line of thinking, the new management strategy of IQs for snow crab reduces competition -with positive consequences for safety --at least while stocks are plentiful and there is control of the timing of the fishery. IQs mean there is no competition to catch as much snow crab before the total allowable catch is landed. Fish harvesters can therefore ideally decide when to harvest "their" snow crab and they have a general sense about how much money they will earn before leaving the wharf. This is, of course, provided they find the snow crab, which according to many respondents, is not so difficult with the latest fish-finding equipment and the limited mobility of snow crab. The underlining assumption here is that snow crab fishing does not require the same level of skill as was demanded in the hunt for cod. This perceived feminization of snow crab harvesting may also reflect the perceived reduction of physicality required to do the work associated with the introduction of hydraulics, and the increased presence of women on board vessels.
If fisheries as sites of work are interpreted as feminine, this has implications for the ways in which men perform masculinity. The changing regulatory and industrial context seems to encourage harvesters to invest in a masculinity that values professional status, business ethics and sophisticated vessels and technologies. This direction is not lost on fish harvesters who say there is tremendous pressure to choose between "going bigger" or getting out. A common interpretation among respondents was that larger boats (measuring over 35 feet) are necessary to acquire quotas and to fish crab successfully. As fishing work and harvesters' relationship to risk and safety are increasingly mediated by sophisticated technologies and larger vessels, inexperience and gaps in knowledge may pose new risks --risks that are not addressed in the Marine Emergency Duties courses. The tendency to for some harvesters to equate safety with owning technologies and larger vessels could contribute to a tendency to take greater risks.
Also, some of the new navigation, communication and safety technologies require specialized knowledge (beyond the scope of a Marine Emergency Duties Course) to operate them.
Navigational technologies, such as Global Position Systems (GPS), are very helpful when traveling to offshore grounds for gear retrieval, staying on course and reducing the risk of collision. However, over-reliance on these technologies and potential knowledge gaps related to their safe operation can undermine safety. Electronic equipment like GPS technology and laptop computers with digital charts often ceases to operate when power supplies fail and, therefore, can be useless when engines fail. GPS technologies can help plot a course and make it easy to return to particular grounds and gear but may not distinguish between water and land. Thus reliance on GPS technology has been associated with fishing vessel groundings.
Conclusion
Fish harvesters' understandings and practices of risk and safety are complex and dynamic. A focus on everyday fisheries risks and practices shifts the discussion away from incident rates and directs attention to day to day work routines and fish harvesters' culturally specific "commonsense" knowledge about risk and safety. In so doing, it demonstrates how official agencies and models that rely on quantifying incidents may miss entirely such mundane risks as working with rope. A focus on the everyday lives of fish harvesters also points to their agency in their attempts to manage and negotiate new fisheries risks associated with snow crab harvesting.
And, contrary to the assumption in Beck's risk society thesis (2005) that traditional social structures are no longer important, this case study makes clear that more nuanced considerations of fisheries risks must consider how risk is mediated by and mediates gender and others structures of inequality. Risk and safety are not isolated "things" out there to be revealed, counted, and neatly governed. Risk and safety are negotiated in specific, gendered contexts.
Over the past decade, we have been witnessing a shift in the local meanings of safety and risk and in what it means to be a fisherman. This shift is not complete nor has it been linear. It seems clear however that a convergence of sorts is occurring -with the state and industry supporting a masculine entrepreneurial and vessel-oriented approach to OHS. This convergence has implications for safety but the connections are sometimes not clear because they are mediated by gender -often an invisible or assumed masculinity. This study on the Newfoundland fisheries demonstrates the important contributions feminist sociology can make to risk and OHS research.
Feminist sociology helps reveal tensions and competing constructions of safety as well as the wider social structures, particularly gender, that mediate understandings of safety and practices.
